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About the Program 
The board of the Society of Actuaries (SOA) authorized in 2017 a research strategy placing increased focus on five 
strategic research programs.  One of those programs is the Catastrophe and Climate Strategic Research Program.  
Some of those programs have launched, and the last one to launch will be the Catastrophe & Climate, in 2021.  A 
steering committee for the program was established in October 2019 as a standing committee and consists of an 
energetic and diverse group of volunteers – actuaries from multiple practice areas and continents, meteorologists, 
academics, and climate policy experts.  The purpose of the programs is to encourage the development of research 
and branding for the SOA on a cohesive theme and related topics, and this program is dedicated to furthering 
actuaries’ and the SOA’s stakeholders’ body of knowledge on climate trends and its impacts, and on catastrophic 
events. 
Our focus has been in identifying areas of climate research which may benefit from traditional actuarial methods or 
which addresses a question for insurers.  We look forward to engaging in further research in 2021, and we look 
forward to helping meet the need for actuarial thought leadership around topics from extreme weather such as 
heat waves and impact on health and mortality to wildfire and flood risk and insurability, and the disparate impact 
all these have by socioeconomic class.  Please read the sections below for a taste of recent completed research and 
current work in progress.  Also important to us is to the education component – developing a series of 
environmental papers and also webinars to educate our members on climate risk. This newsletter also lends a casual 
format to this education component. 
Though it is fair to say our initial efforts as a steering committee have been vetting and prioritizing project themes – 
with a focus on natural catastrophes and insurance costs or future strains caused by climate-related events – we 
have also more recently explored the catastrophe we are in the midst of now, with COVID-19 at each of our front 
doors.  The SOA has been actively shifting resources to address actuarial questions on this pandemic, and we are 
also actively engaged in developing ideas for further in-house research.  We have also just released a call for 
volunteers to submit data visualizations on how COVID-19 is correlated with a risk of choice – anything from long-
term care facility mortality to health insurance availability and mix by US state.  Please consider sending in a 
submission.  To participate, please follow this link for further information:    
https://www.soa.org/research/opportunities/2020-covid-19-visualizations/ 
We also have a set of volunteers in a data group, the Climate Data Analysis Group led by staff member Patrick 
Wiese, which is busy studying various weather databases with the aim of assessing resolution, reporting gaps and 
other weaknesses, and ultimately correlations to actuarial risk.  This is a great example of actuaries coming together 
to study a topic of interest, and we hope to foster that spirit of knowledge-sharing with this preliminary newsletter – 
this is meant for any actuary concerned and interested in climate and catastrophe risk (shouldn’t that be us all?)  
Perhaps this and future iterations will spur further interest, so please read on!  We hope you enjoy, 
 Sara Goldberg 
 Chair, Catastrophe and Climate Strategic Research Program 
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SOA Catastrophe & Climate Published Research Overview – Rob Montgomery 
 
The SOA publishes sponsored research as well as reports completed internally.  Published climate research can be 
found here:  https://www.soa.org/research/topics/research-emerging-topics/#climate 
This category of research reports explores how climate risk may affect the finance and insurance industries.  Topics 
include extreme weather, impact of weather perils on mortgage credit risk, trend reports, ideas for risk pooling, 
modeling, measuring and pricing flood risks, climate risk fundamentals, and sources for actuaries and links to related 
works. 
Works currently underway include the impact of heatwaves on human health and the attribution to climate change, 
appropriate discounting of future climate risks to the present, a series of papers to be published every 1-2 months 
featuring environmental risks, an ongoing series on weather extremes in an historical context and participation in 
the multi-organization Actuaries Climate Index. 
Looking ahead, the Catastrophe & Climate Strategic Research Program looks to sponsor research which focuses on 
the impact of shifting climate patterns and the frequency and severity of events on the public and the insurance 
industry. 
Featured Research Projects – Rob Montgomery 
RESIDENTIAL FLOOD RISK IN THE UNITED STATES 
Residential Flood Risk in the United States: Quantifying Flood Losses, Mortgage Risk and Sea Level Rise was 
published in May 2020 and can be found here:  https://www.soa.org/resources/research-reports/2020/soa-flood-
report/ 
This report examines current countrywide residential exposure to flooding, considers how it could be impacted by 
sea level rise, evaluates how this could affect the financial health of residential householders, explores a new 
technique to determine whether it could impair their ability to meet their mortgage obligations, and analyzes the 
effects of defaults to other parties or institutions. 
 
MODELING, MEASURING AND PRICING FLOOD RISK 
https://www.soa.org/resources/research-reports/2019/flood-risk/ 
As found in this report, floods are, by far, the most frequent and destructive natural disaster in North America. In 
the U.S., they accounted for nearly two-thirds of all presidential disaster declarations over the period from 1953 to 
2010. Floods are particularly devastating because of their pervasive impact, widespread loss of lives and assets, and 
the level of the associated disruption to communities and businesses. Eight out of 10 catastrophes in the U.S. have 
been flood-related, and in the five years leading up to the report all 50 states had experienced flooding with varying 
degrees of severity. The situation is very similar in Canada, where floods are recognized to be the most frequently 
occurring natural hazard. More specifically, the Canadian disaster database had recorded 241 flood disasters 
between the years 1900 and 2006, which is five times the number of wildfires, the next most common disaster in 
the country. 
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Although there is a large body of literature focusing on the investigation of flood risk, the contribution of the 
actuarial community (theoreticians and practitioners) has been rather restricted. The report mentions the following 
three reasons: (1) flood risk possesses characteristics that make it significantly different from the risks that actuaries 
have experience dealing with; (2) flood risk models are highly specialized and therefore not easy to understand for 
someone who is not specifically trained; and (3) flood risk insurance treaties are often not price-to risk contracts, 
which leaves less room to trigger actuarial expertise and involvement. The report discusses these points in more 
detail along with others.  The major goals are (1) to sketch the landscape of flood risk management, in general, and 
flood risk insurance, in particular and (2) to draw the attention of the actuarial community to these subjects and the 
opportunities they present. 
In the News – Michael Fung  
Here are some recent articles focusing on catastrophe, climate and insurance, as well as a climate analysis 
tool that we find interesting.  As you click through to the articles below, we invite you to consider how 
these phenomena and trends can impact actuarial applications, and to note any associations to economic 
and insured losses. 
Tools 
Climate reanalyzer: https://climatereanalyzer.org/wx/DailySummary/#t2anom 
This is a climate monitoring website. This tool provides a lot of useful information, including temperature 
anomalies, which show current temperature vs the historical average.    
 
News clippings 
I) Siberian heat 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/07/15/siberian-heat-streak-arctic-temperature-record-
virtually-impossible-without-global-warming-study-says/   
 
Siberian heat wave not possible without human-
caused global warming, study finds - The 
Washington Post 
In a stark new finding, a study shows that six 
straight months of anomalously mild conditions in 
large parts of northern Siberia so far this year, along 
with an Arctic temperature record of 100.4 ... 
www.washingtonpost.com 
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Awareness of climate change is still important even though we are battling the pandemic. 
II) https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/plastic-pollution-spawned-by-pandemic-
already-hitting-the-oceans  
 
Plastic Pollution Spawned by Pandemic Already 
Hitting the Oceans 
A new kind of plastic has been showing up in the 
oceans in recent months—personal protective 
equipment—joining the discarded plastic straws, 
bags and other detritus polluting the waters. 
news.bloomberglaw.com 
 
III) Reinsurance Price and Negative Outlook 
 
https://www.fitchratings.com/research/insurance/reinsurance-price-hikes-attract-capital-amid-
coronavirus-fallout-26-06-2020  
Reinsurance Price Hikes Attract Capital Amid Coronavirus Fallout - Fitch Ratings 
Fitch Ratings-Chicago/New York-26 June 2020: (Re)insurance market dynamics including increased pricing, 
years of accumulating catastrophic losses, investment market losses and the significant losses expected 
from the fallout of the coronavirus pandemic have led to reinsurers’ push for further price increases, Fitch 
Ratings says. 
www.fitchratings.com 
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Because of the shutdown, the sources of weather data become unstable... 
IV) Covid19 and Weather Forecast Accuracy 
 
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/18/weather/fewer-flights-covid-weather-forecast-hurricane-
impact/index.html  
 
Weather forecasts are less accurate because of 
Covid-19, a new study reveals - CNN 
(CNN)As the US heads into peak hurricane season, a 
reduction in commercial airline flights due to Covid-
19 has significantly impacted our ability to 
accurately forecast the weather. A study out ... 
edition.cnn.com 
 
 
Thanks to climate change, insurers discover new methods to process claims 
V) New Styles of Catastrophe Claims 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/p-c-insurers-
moving-into-new-virtual-era-for-catastrophe-claims-handling-59265048 
  
 
 
Climate change impacts everywhere in the world, including both the northern and southern hemispheres.  
VI) Australian Bushfire Losses 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2020/07/07/574617.htm 
 
Insured Losses for 2019/2020 Australia Bushfires 
Estimated at A$1.9B (US$1.3B): PERILS 
The insurance industry’s loss footprint for the 
Australian bushfires of 2019/2020 is estimated at 
A$1.9 billion (US$1.3 billion), according to PERILS, 
the independent Zurich-based organization ... 
www.insurancejournal.com 
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Good Read – Max Rudolph 
BOOK REVIEW – THE ENDS OF THE WORLD BY PETER BRANNEN 
Peter Brannen is not a scientist, but his ability to describe the distant past in a compelling way makes this 2017 book 
both informative and readable.1 Historically, each of the five extinction events the earth has endured was driven 
either mostly or in part by changes in the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The carbon cycle loses its 
equilibrium when greenhouse gases are released into the atmosphere through volcanic activity over many years. In 
each of these events at least 75% of the species at the time became extinct.  
We are now in a race to determine if humans are causing a sixth extinction, also driven by greenhouse gas 
emissions. Since the beginning of the industrial revolution carbon dioxide in the air, measured today using the 
Keeling Curve, has grown from less than 300 parts per million to over 400. Average temperatures over this period 
have increased by over 1 degree Celsius. This doesn’t seem like a lot, but seemingly small changes have caused both 
hot and cold periods across history. 
The reader is introduced to five events, occurring during the Ordovician period, Devonian period, Permian period (a 
cold event preceded warming), Triassic period (the book debates the role of volcanos played, along with the 
asteroid that hit with an estimated magnitude 12 on the Richter scale) and the Cretaceous period, but is not 
overwhelmed by details. Some of these volcanic events covered entire continents miles deep with lava and released 
gases that temporarily destroyed the ozone layer. 
Volcanic activity puts carbon dioxide in the atmosphere as a greenhouse gas and makes the oceans of the world 
acidic as the water absorbs the gases, but also releases sulfuric dioxide that blocks solar radiation. You can temper 
greenhouse gases with limited volcanic activity because of the sulfur and this can create ice ages, but eventually 
long-lasting volcanic activity increases levels of carbon dioxide and warms the planet. None of these outcomes is 
conducive to supporting life. Plants may flourish within a small band of higher temperatures by absorbing more 
carbon, but the environment moves at a pace beyond their ability to adapt. Today we see aquatic life moving 
toward the poles, crops more successful as they move away from the equator and wild plants moving higher up 
mountains to a cooler climate. We are testing the ecosystem’s ability to keep up with these changes, starting with a 
band surrounding the equator. Extinctions are occurring at much higher rates than would normally be expected, but 
it is not too late yet to avoid a mass extinction. 
The book provides thought provoking comments about oxygen’s role in life processes. An example that is recent 
enough to understand is the mini ice age that may have been caused as reforestation drove natural carbon capture 
after the peak American Indian population (their agriculture was built around slash-and-burn techniques), when 
Europeans arrived with various diseases (e.g., smallpox, measles) the indigenous peoples had no immunity against. 
Over time, humans have converted half of earth’s land surface to farmland. As a result of using nitrogen and 
phosphorous fertilizers, runoff has depleted oxygen in rivers, lakes and coasts of oceans, creating dead zones. 
Perhaps the common-sense answer to today’s biodiversity threat goes back to the carbon cycle. Photosynthesis, 
weathering and erosion, and dying plants and animals capture carbon that ends up underground. Continents collide, 
creating mountains. Respiration, volcanic activity and burning (of plant matter or fossil fuels) add carbon to the 
atmosphere. This cycle has been in balance for millions of years. During the past 250 years humans have released 
                                                                
 
1 Brannen, Peter. The Ends of the World: Volcanic Apocalypses, lethal oceans, and our quest to understand earth’s past mass extinctions. 2017. 
HarperCollins Publishers. 
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carbon back into the air and sea through fossil fuel extraction and burning. The earth has moved away from 
equilibrium, with continued pressure to warm, so it will take a dedicated effort to move back in balance.  
What’s important to remember is that the earth always survives these events. It doesn’t care if dinosaurs or man 
roam the earth. It always has another day. The pace of change of atmospheric carbon dioxide matters, and we are 
allowing it to accumulate in the atmosphere much faster even than these extinction events.  
Humans have created a scenario that is unique in the history of the earth. We impact the ecosystem in ways that we 
control. As population levels are estimated by the United Nations to grow toward 11 billion people,2 our actions 
have reduced diversity and set up feedback loops as temperatures, pollution and resource exploitation have all 
increased. Higher order interactions matter. We could be approaching a tipping point that leads to rapid ecosystem 
collapse. A leading indicator will be regional conflicts, or water wars, where combatants fight over fresh water using 
even more fossil fuels. Brannen’s book walks the reader through five times in the past when the ecosystem crashed 
and expresses hope that we can change direction before it is too late to avoid a sixth. Let’s hope he is right. 
Max J. Rudolph, FSA, CFA, CERA, MAAA is principal at Rudolph Financial Consulting, LLC. He can be reached at 
max.rudolph@rudolph-financial.com 
Studies / Research Published Outside the SOA 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND MARKET-BASED INSURANCE FEEDBACKS 
The University of Nebraska 
  
Climate Change and Market-Based Insurance Feedbacks 
Eric R. Holley1*, Adam J. Liska1,2,3, Cory G. Walters4, Geoffrey C. Friesen5, Michael J. Hayes1, Max J. Rudolph6, Donald 
A. Wilhite1 
School of Natural Resources1, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68583. Departments of Biological Systems 
Engineering2 and Agronomy & Horticulture3, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68583. Department of Agricultural 
Economics4, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68583. College of Business5, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 
68588. Rudolph Financial Consulting, LLC6, Elkhorn, NE 68022.  
*Corresponding author:  
ericholley@huskers.unl.edu  
650 W D St. 
Lincoln, NE 68522 
                                                                
 
2 https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/world-population-prospects-2019.html 
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Climatic events have accounted for 91% of $1.05 trillion in insured costs for global catastrophic events from 1980 to 
2016. Costs are driven by socio-economic development and increased frequency and severity of climatic disasters driven 
by climate change. Government policies to reduce systemic risk (e.g., cap-and-trade, carbon tax) have been a 
predominant approach for mitigation and adaptation. Alternatively, market-based incentives for climate change 
adaptation and mitigation already operate via the insurance industry to lessen impacts on society. Insurance feedbacks 
include changes in 1) premiums and insurance policies, 2) non-coverage, and 3) policy making and litigation. Alongside 
government policies, insurance feedbacks could be used to facilitate climate change adaptation and mitigation to a 
significant degree. Ultimately, a negotiated distribution of climate-related costs between the public and private 
insurance is needed. 
 
Keywords: Insurance, Risk, Catastrophic Disasters, Adaptation, Resilience  
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1. Introduction 
Adaptation and mitigation are the reactive and proactive (respectively) responses to an event. Adaptation measures 
reduce direct impacts from an event (e.g., sandbags against a flood) whereas mitigation measures reduce risk of an 
event (e.g., frequency and/or severity of natural catastrophes). Government policies have been a predominant 
approach to adapt to and mitigate climate change impacts (Drouet, et al. 2015; Stern 2015). Yet past political 
agreements have been largely unsuccessful in reducing carbon emissions necessary to avert probable widespread 
catastrophic effects (Stern 2015). Changes in insurance coverage has been identified as an important external factor 
in driving adaptation and mitigation measures, among many other factors (USGCRP, 2018). Where future binding 
agreements are slow to develop (Stern 2007; Lomborg 2010), insurance feedbacks are under-recognized mechanisms 
and incentives to induce climate change adaptation and mitigation (Mills 2005; Mills 2012; Kunreuther et al. 2013; 
Botzen 2013; Attali 2006; III 2014). Market-based insurance feedbacks that are systemic, forceful, and knowledge-
driven may become more active and apparent as the percentage of insured claims increases from natural catastrophes 
(Figure 1). Alongside other factors, market-based insurance feedbacks provide a framework to recognize the 
challenges posed by climate change and incorporate the problem and potential solutions into existing structures 
(USGCRP, 2018). Each factor has its limitations, and must be part of a larger, coordinated effort to address climate 
change adaptation and mitigation. 
 
Figure 1. Insured losses as fraction of overall losses from natural catastrophes, 1980 to 2016. Source: Munich Re 2016. 
In 2019, the World Economic Forum ranked extreme weather events, failure of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, and natural catastrophes as the first, second and third most probable (respectively) and the third, second, 
and fifth most impactful economic risks to occur in the next 10 years (WEF 2019). Downside risks associated with 
weather-related events are increasingly managed by the insurance industry, the largest global economic sector, with 
revenue of $4.6 trillion or 7% of the global economy in 2011 (Mills 2012). Climatic events have accounted for 91% of 
the $1.05 trillion in insured losses concerning property and casualty insurance claims from 1980 to 2016 for global 
catastrophic events, and average costs per event have been steadily increasing (Figure 2); Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, 
and Maria in 2017 further add to this trend. Mounting external costs are also not included on corporate balance 
sheets or asset prices (Dietz et al. 2016). But businesses, governments, and financially concerned organizations are 
increasingly incorporating externalities in their plans and are making climate risk management a higher priority 
(Chestney 2016).  
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Figure 2. Overall and insured costs per event globally from 1980 to 2016 for relevant events only (At least 1 death 
and/or produced normalized losses ≥ US$ 100k, 300k, 1m, or 3m (depending on the assigned World Bank income 
group of the affected country). Source: Munich Re 2016.  
 
The following sections describe the forceful and extensive mechanisms by which the insurance industry manages its 
role in adaptation and mitigation in market-based insurance markets. While some of our specific examples may cite 
the United States, these mechanisms and feedback processes are fundamental features of market-based insurance 
markets.  Although the United States has the largest single share, the ten largest non-life insurance markets include 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Korea, Canada, Spain, Italy and Switzerland (OECD, 2016).  Moreover, 
the most rapid percentage growth in private non-life insurance markets is occurring in Ecuador, Nicaragua, Columbia, 
Finland, Singapore, Poland, Israel, Portugal, Mexico and South Africa (OECD, 2017).  Thus, the mechanisms described 
in our paper already operate in many developed countries (excluding public-private markets) and are rapidly 
expanding in a number of developing countries with market-based insurance. The descriptions following serve as a 
basis to understand the crucial interactions between the public and the insurance industry and to provide a framework 
for future research.  
 
2. Premiums and Insurance Policy Feedbacks 
Insurance premiums act as a signal of the average probability of a loss, and high initial premiums generally deter 
customers (Höppe and Gurenko 2006, Kunreuther et al. 2013). Insurers will only offer catastrophe insurance if 
premiums can be priced sufficiently and where risks are not excessively uncertain (Jaffee and Russell 1997; Kunreuther 
and Michel-Kerjan 2007; Ferguson 2008). Premiums often reflect one-year contracts between the insurer and insured. 
This time frame allows premiums to be adjusted in response to new information about the expected value of future 
losses in the short or long term. An increase in premiums to cover the newly-realized costs and unknown risks from 
climate change may leave previously insured assets without insurance and exposed to financial losses (Mills 2005; 
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2007; Young and Schwartz 2014). Financial viability of policies also relies on applying 
differential pricing to coverage limits and deductibles (Höppe and Gurenko 2006). Individual actions can lead to policy 
benefits, such as premium discounts or higher levels of coverage due to increased risk reduction behaviors (Botzen et 
al. 2009), which may also reduce post-disaster risk associated with structural failures or environmental contaminants.  
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High premiums signal there is a large amount of uncertainty, or that more risk management techniques by 
at-risk parties are needed (Höppe and Gurenko 2006). Individual adaptation or societal mitigation can lead to 
decreased risk and cost savings for society (Ferguson 2008; Young and Schwartz 2014; Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther 
2011; Aerts and Botzen 2011). For example, in a hard-market scenario, where events lead to higher premiums and 
full adaptation, annual premium costs were projected to decrease to $5-6 billion after adaptation compared to $10-
14 billion with existing building status in Florida (Young and Schwartz 2014). More proactive engagement of risk 
management is a valuable investment that builds resilience and ultimately reduces insured losses (Jaffee et al. 2008). 
However, the cost of risk reduction may offset the effectiveness of risk-based pricing (Surminski 2016) as those most 
vulnerable to risks may not be able to afford risk-based premiums or have the means to reduce their risk. This equity-
efficiency tradeoff (Picard 2008) might be bridged through subsidies for risk-reduction measures, subsidized 
insurance, cost-effective technology, or a guaranteed reduction in premiums to offset the initial or recurring costs of 
adaptation and mitigation efforts (Botzen et al 2009; Surminski 2016).  
But empirical studies show that people do not voluntarily invest in adaptation measures even when they are 
cost effective (Kunreuther et al. 2011, Bouwer et al. 2007). The theory of moral hazard suggests that those with a risk 
sharing mechanism such as insurance may be more likely to engage in risky behavior due to the protection provided 
by that risk sharing mechanism (Hölmstrom 1979). However, Hudson et al. (2017) found that in some catastrophe 
insurance markets moral hazard is not present, due likely to the internal characteristics of individual policy-holders 
and the low-probability/high-impact nature of catastrophe events. Strong market pressure and marketable solutions, 
such as catastrophe bonds that transfer peak risks to capital markets, are proven incentives to adopt adaptation 
measures (Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther 2011). Multi-year contracts could also make the benefits of adaptation 
clearer, as the probability of a disaster during the time frame would be higher (Dlugolecki and Hoekstra 2006; 
Kunreuther et al. 2011; Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther 2011). Incentives that both limit damage and reduce the 
probability of natural catastrophes have been the most effective way to reduce extreme costs (Aerts et al. 2008).  
Premiums reflect the direct demand and supply of insurance policies between customers and the insurance industry 
(Surminski et al., 2016). High premiums signal limited coverage availability, or low supply, due to high uncertainty or 
risk. These high premiums decrease the demand for coverage as many cannot afford it. Subsidizing premiums allows 
for more affordable premiums but ultimately fails to reduce risk and reduces the effectiveness of feedback between 
insurer and insured. While climate insurance can enhance resilience by providing post-disaster liquidity (World Bank, 
2012), this requires affordable coverage. Lowering premiums to reward mitigation and adaptation behavior can help 
bridge the gap between higher premiums and affordable coverage for policy-holders (reflecting reduced risk of loss 
and greater certainty, resulting in lower premiums).  
 
3. Non-Coverage Feedbacks 
Inaction is a major factor contributing to negative economic impacts from climate change (Tucker 1997). The 
undesired result of inaction is non-coverage, consisting of two subtypes: (1) insurance premiums do not reflect true 
risk, leading insurers to not offer a policy and (2) premiums are allowed to reflect true risk, but the premiums and 
deductibles (out-of-pocket costs for a claim) are too costly for the consumer to purchase the policy (Kunreuther et al. 
2013; Botzen et al. 2009; Tucker 1997). Non-coverage occurs when the insurance supply is low and premiums are 
high (Surminski, 2016). Non-coverage is a deterrent to compounding harmful behaviors related to climate change 
such as rebuilding in catastrophe zones and failing to improve preparation or response to catastrophes (Mills 2005; 
Aerts and Botzen 2011; Tucker 1997). Non-coverage also pressures public organizations to assume more climate risks, 
which may lead to more federal debt. When the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) insured damages from 
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Sandy, the NFIP incurred $24 billion in debt from these hurricanes alone (Kunreuther et 
al. 2013; Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2007). Other examples include hurricane protection in Florida, earthquake 
protection in California, and the crop insurance system in the United States (Kousky and Kunreuther 2017).  
Risk financing comes from a variety of sources (Figure 3).  The primary source is the party itself through a 
deductible (where losses are paid through savings or working capital) for events that are below a threshold of cost 
and are usually frequent and not severe. Insurance protects against events that are somewhat frequent and severe 
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enough that equity alone cannot cover the losses.  Reinsurance, state-aid, and tort law cover rare events that have 
high financial impacts which an insurance company’s equity alone cannot cover. These methods transfer risks from 
an insurer to a third-party, protecting them in the case of a catastrophic event. Tort law is rare but may increase in 
the future if significant disagreements over liability continue.  
 
 
Figure 3. Financing climatic loss at different levels of risk. 
 
Events leading up to non-coverage and the effects of non-coverage can be seen in the Saint Bernard Parish district of 
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (Ferguson 2008). Total insured losses of at least $41 billion occurred; the risk to 
insure parts of New Orleans is extremely high and lack of understanding of these risks also plays a part in keeping 
premiums too high to afford (King 2008). Contrasting interpretations of significant natural catastrophe risk, due to 
differences in assumptions and design of catastrophe models and minimal understanding of catastrophes, can lead to 
a large amount of uncertainty (King 2008). Many insurance agencies chose not to provide coverage in New Orleans as 
a result; a similar situation could occur in other places as more extreme events occur and flood plain maps are 
redrawn. The probability of non-coverage will be reduced with mutual adaptation and communication as well as 
increased understanding of the impacts of climate change.  
 
4. Policymaking and Litigation Feedbacks 
The insurance industry has a role in influencing public policy (Kunreuther 2013, Attali 2006; Kleindorfer and 
Kunreuther 1999). Government policies affect the industry directly by exempting parties from liability, subsidizing 
insurance deductibles or premiums, engaging in reinsurance, or providing coverage that competes with private sector 
insurance (Mills 2005). The role of government has decreased over the last 20 years as insurance coverage of natural 
disaster relief has increased from 20% to 40% in developed countries (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2007). While 
developed economies have a buffer from widespread loss, the ability of this buffer to protect nations from crippling 
loss effects is dwindling as the rate and severity of natural disasters increases (Kunreuther et al. 2013; Kunreuther and 
Michel-Kerjan 2007). As the need for more effective relief becomes apparent, many governments are using insurance 
to provide a reliable system for their citizens (Kunreuther et al. 2013; Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2007; Tucker 
1997).  The insurance industry interacts with the public sector in providing protection against risks, although there 
is always disagreement over the allocations of costs (Mills 2005). The lack of cohesion in the response to Hurricane 
Katrina is one example of non-optimized risk allocation that resulted in $109 billion in post-disaster assistance and $8 
billion in tax relief provided by the government (McCoppin 2014). For insurance and government to be more efficient 
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and effective at disaster adaptation, mitigation, and relief, there must be more highly coordinated policy. Due to the 
immense costs from climate change, significant disagreements over the distribution of costs between the two sectors 
are not in the best interests of either party (Piketty 2014). 
Litigation from insurance to government has been the result of ineffective policy or failure to reasonably 
foresee and adapt to the impacts of climate change. In 2013, The Farmers Insurance Co. sued the city of Chicago, 
Illinois for damages caused by storm water and sewage overflow because local municipalities knew that the drainage 
systems were inadequate but failed to take reasonable action to prevent damages (Sullivan 2014). The suit was 
eventually withdrawn, stating that the important issues were brought to the attention of the respective cities and 
counties and with the hope that policyholders’ interests will be protected in the future (Sullivan 2014). As climate 
change impacts are further researched and understanding grows, more government entities and businesses may be 
held responsible via similar law suits for damages caused by climate change if proactive action is not taken to increase 
system resiliency (Sullivan 2014; Sustainable Brands 2017).  
 Coordination of efforts between government and insurers is crucial in developing a strong plan to provide 
affordable, adequate insurance coverage in the face of increasing risk from climate change (Glaas et al. 2016). 
Collaboration of building codes and standards, sharing of data, and better communication are all examples of action 
that can provide the knowledge and means necessary for policy-holders to adopt mitigation and adaptation measures 
and allow insurers to offer rewards or lower premiums for these measures. These actions can also provide direct 
feedback between the public, the government, and private insurers on how best to reduce risk and decrease costs for 
all stakeholders involved.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Increased losses from climatic catastrophes will challenge insurance systems to adapt and offer affordable coverage 
(Botzen 2013). Risk financing systems, including insurance, will need to be cautious of downside risks that can cause 
disincentives, market failures, and decrease equity (Botzen 2013). We must bear in mind that market-based insurance 
and its associated feedbacks are not a panacea, should not be expected to work well in all circumstances, and may 
even produce negative outcomes.  Like all firms, insurance companies are vulnerable to agency problems and conflicts 
of interest such as those described by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  While mechanisms exist within firms to mitigate 
such conflicts, they are imperfect and sometimes the social costs of a firm’s actions outweigh the benefits.  In addition, 
there are numerous contexts in which insurance markets simply fail to form despite the fact there are real human 
needs or problems to be addressed.  The failure to form can arise from problems such as adverse selection (Rothschild 
and Stiglitz, 1976), moral hazard (Smith and Stutzer, 1995) or even a lack of perceived risks on the part of the public.  
In the absence of market-based insurance, the feedback mechanisms described in this paper will fail to develop.  In 
these instances, alternative mechanisms must be established, which may include mutual aid or cooperative insurance 
arrangements (Smith and Stutzer, 1995), public-private partnerships or direct government intervention among many 
other new and/or novel solutions. In addition, the scale of insurance feedbacks affects their viability as a factor in 
adaptation and mitigation measures. Some risks need to be addressed on a scale larger than an individual and the 
feedbacks discussed will be less effective without external forces and other factors (USGCRP, 2018).  
Through improved research, the interactions between the insurance industry and society can create more 
efficient and effective risk management strategies for public and private interests to address the challenges associated 
with climate change (Botzen 2013). Future avenues of research should include the complexity of these feedback loops 
and insurers’ response to the discussed risk factors, including both climate and other risks. Specific interactions among 
these risks is not well understood and further empirical work on the dependencies of these risk factors is necessary. 
Another key challenge facing insurers is how to integrate climate change into their existing business models and 
including underwriting procedures that help to integrate these climate risks. Similarly, we do not look at specific 
methods for incentivizing risk reduction and empirical analysis of the efficacy of practices on risk reduction will help 
to provide a more detailed understanding of which elements of the feedback processes work best. Encouraging 
proactive cooperation between private insurers and government can increase the probability that mitigation 
techniques and adaptation can align incentives to protect assets. The insurance industry will continue to be a forceful 
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and systemic mechanism to drive adaption and mitigation to climate change impacts in the absence of, and alongside, 
effective government policies, but further research is needed to clarify these relationships. Insurance can serve as a 
market-based approach to climate change that exists alongside policy-based approaches, a diversity that can shore-
up the weaknesses of policy-based approaches and provide new and potent avenues for climate change adaptation 
and mitigation.  
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